ONE OF THE MOST prominent theorists of anarcho-capitalism is Hans- Hermann Hoppe. In what is perhaps his most famous result, the argumentation ethic for libertarianism, he purports to establish an a priori defense of the justice of a social order based exclusively on pri- vate property. Hoppe claims that all participants in a debate must presuppose the libertarian principle that every person owns himself, since the principle underlies the very concept of argumentation. Some libertarians (e.g., Rothbard 1988) (...) have celebrated Hoppe’s argument as the final nail in the coffin for collectivism of any type; following Hoppe, they believe that to deny the libertarian ethic is not only wrong, but also internally contradictory. On the other hand, a number of other prominent libertarians characterized Hoppe’s initial statement of his case as “one muddle after another” (Steele 1988, p. 47) or “a tissue of bald assertions” (Yeager 1988, p. 45). (shrink)

Luther ist nur eine Stimme unter den spätmittelalterlichen Reformbewegungen. Die historische Forschung stellt die Lutherische Reformation inzwischen in den breiten Strom christlicher Reformbewegungen seit dem 13. Jahrhundert. Vor diesem Hintergrund muss auch das aufklärerische Bild von Luther als einem Protagonisten der Neuzeit revidiert werden. Die Vielfalt spätmittelalterlicher Reformbewegungen bis hin zum Trienter Konzil bildet zusammen mit dem Renaissancehumanismus ein reiches Reservoir an geistigen Aufbrüchen, von denen zahlreiche Beziehungen zur Moderne ausgehen. Mit diesem komplexen Geflecht zwischen christlichen Reformation(en) und Moderne beschäftigen (...) sich die ausgewählten Studien in diesem Band sowohl aus theologischer als auch philosophischer Perspektive. The contemporary historical research situates Luther’s Reformation in a much larger context of Christian reform movements that emerge in the late medieval and early modern period. Against this background the enlightened view of Luther as protagonist of the modern era is in need of revision. The variety of reform movements together with the Renaissance humanism compose a rich reservoir of spiritual reforms that will all influence the further development of the modern era. In this volume, this complex of the variety of Christian reforms relative to modernity is elaborated through exemplary studies from a philosophical-theological perspective. (shrink)

In this paper, first, I want to clarify the nature and function of private property. Second, I want to clarify the distinction between “common” goods and property and “public” goods and property, and explain the construction error inherent in the institution of public goods and property. Third, I want to explain the rationale and principle of privatization.

Ausgehend von einer Gegenüberstellung der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundpositionen des Empirismus und der Transzendentalphilosophie (Apriorismus) will der Autor am Beispiel der Probleme «Begriffsbildung» und «Kausalität» zeigen, wie sich klassische philosophische Kontroversen (Hume-Kant) unter Zuhilfenahme erkenntnistheoretisch relevanter biologisch-psychologischer Forschungsergebnisse (J. Piaget, K. Lorenz) lösen lassen.

Marxism from a false starting point. Finally, I will demonstrate how Austrianism in the Mises—Rothbard tradition can give a correct but categorically different explanation of their validity. bet me begin with the hard core of the Marxist belief system: (1) "The history of mankind is the history of class struggles."2 It is the history of struggles between a relatively small ruling class and a larger class of the exploited. The primary form of exploitation is economic: The ruling class expropriates part (...) of t.he productive output of the exploited or, as Marxists say, ‘it appropriates a social surplus product" and uses it for its own consumptive.. (shrink)

One so-called paradox of blackmail concerns the fact that “two legal whites together make a black.” That is, it is licit to threaten to reveal a person’s secret, and it is separately lawful to ask him for money; but when both are undertaken at once, together, this act iscalled blackmail and is prohibited. A second so-called paradox is that if the blackmailer initiates the act, this is seen by jurists asblackmail and illicit, while if the blackmailee (the person blackmailed) originates (...) the contract, this is commonly interpreted as bribery and is not illicit.But these are paradoxes only for legal theorists innocent of libertarian theory. The authors use that perspective to reject the claim thatblackmail should be unlawful. If this act were legalized, then both paradoxes would disappear, precisely their contention. (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

Published in 1960, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s _Truth and Method_ is one of the most influential books on interpretation to have appeared in the past half century. Scholars across the humanities have applied, discussed, and criticized its insights. This volume aims to continue this conversation between hermeneutics and the humanities and tries to map Gadamer’s influence on the humanities, while identifying the possibilities for further interaction between his ideas and contemporary scholarship. This bilingual collection is essential reading for scholars interested in (...) issues of methodology, theory, and philosophy. (shrink)

Controverting Kierkegaard is the fourth and final volume in the series Selected Works of K. E. Løgstrup. The other books are Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Lao-tzu and the Tao-te-chingJonathan R. HermanLao-tzu and the Tao-te-ching. Edited by Livia Kohn and Michael LaFargue. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 330.Modern scholarship on the Tao Te Ching has tended to focus on questions of authorship and the intended meaning of the text, often working from both the unquestioned assumption that matters of origination are of primary historical importance and the quasi-theological (...) bias that the original textual meaning is somehow the "right" or authoritative one. But the role of the Tao Te Ching in Chinese history and culture, as well as that of its purported author, is a much more complex affair. The text has been the subject of more than seven hundred commentaries and has been appropriated by vast networks of scholars, government officials, self-conscious religious communities, and laypeople, while Lao Tzu himself has undergone a fascinating history of deification and aesthetic representation. With Lao-tzu and the Tao-te-ching, editors Livia Kohn and Michael LaFargue take steps toward filling in some of the complicated (and much overlooked) post-canonical history by assembling essays on subjects ranging from the ritual uses of the text to modern hermeneutic experiments. The volume includes nine new essays, as well as three older ones reprinted or translated from earlier sources.The book is organized in four sections—"Ancient Myths," "Chinese Interpretations," "Modern Readings," and "Critical Methods"—although there is noticeable [End Page 625] overlap among the parts. The twelve essays are of varying quality and of varying use for different readers. Some of the material is highly technical and presupposes a sinological audience, while other material rehearses data that should already be familiar to scholars of ancient Chinese philosophy but may be tremendously useful to those who are interested in the text but lacking the scholarly background. One case of the latter is Julia Hardy's "Influential Western Interpretations of the Tao-te-ching," which does not especially break new ground but is a wonderful historical synopsis of Western scholarship on the text, as it meticulously identifies the key interpretive voices and sorts out their positions. Hardy gives only brief attention to the earliest eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholarship—omitting, for example, any mention of Victor von Strauss' 1870 German rendition—which might actually have been most edifying for specialists. LaFargue and Julian Pas' "On Translating the Tao-te-ching" is essentially a primer on hermeneutic problems relevant to the text that serves as an intelligent corrective to the uncoordinated body of Taoist materials available to novice readers.What may be most clear from several of the essays taken in tandem is that the popular Western "mystical" reading of the text not only is one of many historical interpretations but is also very much heir to Wang Pi's intellectual lineage. In "A Tale of Two Commentaries: Ho-shang-kung and Wang Pi on the Lao-tzu," Alan K. L. Chan notes how such standard tenets as the spiritualized metaphysical understanding of Tao, the relationship between nonbeing and creativity, and the identification of naturalness and nonaction with spontaneity originate with Wang Pi but are nowhere to be found in the earlier Ho-shang-kung reading. The latter employs typical Han dynasty correlative cosmological interpretive methods, referring to naturalness as the preservation of energies in the physical body and to "the One" not as an abstract metaphysical oneness but as "the original substance of life itself, energy in its most pure and potent form" (p. 93). According to Isabel Robinet's "Later Commen-taries: Textual Polysemy and Syncretistic Interpretations," the panoply of text interpretations falls into roughly three categories—"technical or specialist readings," "philosophical exegeses," and "inner alchemy interpretations," which she then proceeds to divide further into "philological" and "ideological" readings. This is all further complicated when one considers the Tao Te Ching not as a strictly philosophical text but as a collection of polemical aphorisms, as LaFargue does in "Recovering the Tao-te-ching's Original Meaning: Some Remarks on Historical Hermeneutics," or as a ritual, liturgical or meditative aid, as Kohn does in "The Tao-te-ching in Ritual."Lao-tzu and the... (shrink)

Hans-Hermann Hoppe contends that the fact that a person has the capacity to argue entails that she has the moral right of exclusive control over her own body. Critics of Hoppe’s argument do not appear to have pinpointed its flaws. I expose the logical structure of Hoppe’s argument, distinguishing its pragmatic-contradiction and its mutual-recognition components. I provide three counterexamples to show that Hoppe’s mutual-recognition argument is invalid and I argue that the truth that appears to (...) motivate the argument is simply a banality. I show that Hoppe’s pragmatic-contradiction argument is invalid, has a false premise and fails to link up with his mutual-recognition argument in the way that he requires to reach his conclusion. I conclude by outlining three perils of pragmatic-contradiction arguments, the weakness of mutual-recognition arguments, and the implausibility of attempts to derive a universal moral status from a specialised activity such as argumentation. (shrink)

Some of the authors of the essays on Chinese philosophers prefer the pin yin system of romanization for Chinese names and words, while others prefer the Wade‐Giles system. Given that both systems are in wide use today, important names and words are given in both their pin yin and Wade‐Giles formulations. The author's preference is printed first, followed by the alternative romanization within brackets.

Murray N. Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe build their libertarian theory of justice on two axioms concerning self-ownership and homesteading, which are bolstered by two key arguments: reductio ad absurdum and performative contradiction. Each of these arguments is designed to demonstrate that libertarianism is the only theory of justice that can be justified. If either of these arguments were valid, it would prove the libertarian claim that the state is an unjust political arrangement. Giving due weight to the importance (...) of the libertarian anarchist claim, this article exposes and criticizes the arguments that substantiate it. (shrink)

The purpose of the presented paper is to showcase the links between Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s libertarian argumentation ethics and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics with a special reference to the consensus theory of truth proposed by the latter thinker. More specifically, the author contends that Hoppe’s theory is logically contingent on Apel’s views on truth in that some crucial gaps in Hoppe’s grounding of the so-called “a priori of communication and argumentation” are filled by Apel’s original arguments. Additionally, (...) the paper provides a case for interpreting Hoppe's ethics as a theory of rational conflict-freedom, which seems to cohere best with the transcendental-pragmatist approach. Finally, the author offers a few remarks on how the most common objections against Hoppe's theory can be overcome on the basis of the transcendental pragmatics and the conflict-freedom principle. (shrink)

We defend a view according to which Austrian economics rests on what can most properly be called an Aristotelian methodology. This implies a realist perspective, according to which the world exists independently of our thinking and reasoning activities; an essentialist perspective, according to which the world contains certain simple essences or natures which may come together in law-like ways to form more complex static and dynamic wholes, and an apriorist perspective, according to which given essences and essential structures are intelligible, (...) in the sense that they ca be grasped non-inductively in our thinking. We show the consequences of this view for an analysis of the thinking of Mises and Hoppe, both of which – we claim – incorporate what we believe to be foreign mixtures of Kantianism in their account of the foundations of Austrian economics. (shrink)

A critical but underdeveloped part of the libertarian debate about immigration is the question of who, if anyone, owns public property, and the consequences of the answer to this question. Libertarians who favor restrictive immigration policies, such as Hans-Hermann Hoppe, argue that taxpayers own public property, and that the state, while it is in control of such property, should manage it on behalf of taxpayers in the same way private owners would manage their own property. In other words, (...) it should be quite selective about who may enter. Walter Block, who takes an “open borders” position, does not appear to dispute the claim that taxpayers own public property, but nevertheless argues that immigrants are entitled to ignore the state’s control of, and thus may freely enter, such property. In this article I explore the question of public property ownership using Rothbardian property rights principles. I conclude that, at least with respect to a particular type of public property, neither Hoppe’s nor Block’s reasoning is consistent with these principles. I also consider the idea that the state ought to have a role in managing public property in light of some libertarian anarchist ideas about the state. I conclude that supporting a legitimate role for the state as an immigration gatekeeper is inconsistent with Rothbardian and Hoppean libertarian anarchism, as well as with the associated strategy of advocating always and in every instance reductions in the state’s role in society. (shrink)

Speaking at the third annual meeting of The Property and Freedom Society in Bodrum on Friday, May 23, financial journalist Peter Brimelow1 presented his views on immigration under the title “Immigration is the Viagra of the State—A libertarian case against Immigration.” However, his argument had little concern for the controversies that divide libertarians on the issue of immigration.2 After a brief look at Brimelow’s comments, I shall consider the requirements an argument should meet if it is to amount to a (...) libertarian case for or against a particular policy such as a liberal or a restrictive immigration policy.3 Then I shall offer a critique of libertarian philosopher Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s attempt to build a case against immigration on widely accepted libertarian principles. Finally, I shall present some test cases for judging the plausibility of the argument. (shrink)

The subject-matter of the paper is the theory of class struggle proposed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, one of the leading representatives of libertarian political philosophy in the radical tradition of Murray N. Rothbard. The author reconstructs and critically comments on the theory at hand. The author's remarks focus on the ethical and methodological background of Hoppe's approach, the main question being whether the latter theory is consonant with the thinker's positions on ethics and methodology, as well as with (...) his political standpoint. The author argues that not only does class analysis not contradict other core beliefs of Hoppe but it also represents an indispensable element of his libertarian philosophy. There is, however, a significant tension between the class approach and Hoppe's secondary philosophical position – his historical idealism. The article is concluded by indicating some further issues in the Hoppean theory of class that, in the author's opinion, should be subject to future inquiry. (shrink)

_Insensitive Semantics_ is an overview of and contribution to the debates about how to accommodate context sensitivity within a theory of human communication, investigating the effects of context on communicative interaction and, as a corollary, what a context of utterance is and what it is to be in one. Provides detailed and wide-ranging overviews of the central positions and arguments surrounding contextualism Addresses broad and varied aspects of the distinction between the semantic and non-semantic content of language Defends a distinctive (...) and explanatorily powerful combination of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism Confronts core problems which not only run to the heart of philosophy of language and linguistics, but which arise in epistemology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy as well. (shrink)

We give a precis of our book Insensitive Semantics.

A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant (...) construction recipes for minimal changes of belief states. These relations, however, are required to satisfy rather demanding conditions. In the present paper we liberalize the concept of epistemic entrenchment by removing connectivity, minimality and maximality conditions. Correspondingly, we achieve a liberalization of the concept of rational belief change that does no longer presuppose the postulates of success and rational monotony. We show that the central results of Gärdenfors and Makinson are preserved in our more flexible setting. Moreover, the generalized concept of epistemic entrenchment turns out to be applicable also to relational and iterated belief changes. (shrink)

The paper attacks the almost universally held view that belief revison theories, as they have been studied in the literature of the past two decades, are founded on a Principle of Minimal Change, or Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting new information, aim at a posterior belief set that minimizes the items on which it disagrees with the prior belief set. If there are different ways to effect (...) the belief change, then according to the second version, the agent should give up the beliefs that are least entrenched. Although widely endorsed and advertised by belief revision theorists, the paper argues that both versions of the principle are dogmas that are not in fact (and perhaps should not be) adhered to. Two simple mathematical observations substantiate this claim, and it is defended against four possible objections that involve contractions, reconstructions, dispositions, and truths. (shrink)

In this Introduction, we aim to introduce the reader to the basic topic of this book. As part of this, we explain why we are using two different expressions (‘conceptual engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’) to describe the topics in the book. We then turn to some of the central foundational issues that arise for conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, and finally we outline various views one might have about their role in philosophy and inquiry more generally.

The view defended in this paper - I call it the No-Assertion view - rejects the assumption that it is theoretically useful to single out a subset of sayings as assertions: (v) Sayings are governed by variable norms, come with variable commitments and have variable causes and effects. What philosophers have tried to capture by the term 'assertion' is largely a philosophers' invention. It fails to pick out an act-type that we engage in and it is not a category we (...) need in order to explain any significant component of our linguistic practice. Timothy Williamson (2000) defends a theory of type (i). He says that a theory of assertion has as its goal "[…] that of articulating for the first time the rules of a traditional game that we play" (p. 240). Among those who think we play the game of assertion, there's disagreement about what the rules are. Some think it's a single rule and disagree about what that rule is. Others think the rules change across contexts. According to the No-Assertion view we don’t play the assertion game. The game might exist as an abstract object, but it is not a game you need to learn and play to become a speaker of a natural language. (shrink)